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Abstract This article examines the various legal aspects involved in Scotland’s
independence, focusing on the legal implications for other European regions.
Essentially the results of this analysis might also provide useful guidance for other
regions in Europe contemplating independence, such as Catalonia or Flanders. In
order to offer an overview of the questions that may arise, membership of inter-
national organizations and succession of states are taken into account. This paper
will then turn to the EU law aspects of Scottish independence; in particular it will
address the question of how Scotland’s independence would affect its status vis-a`-
vis the EU.
Keywords Scottish referendum  EU membership  Independence  Scotland 
Self-determination  Sovereignty
Introduction
‘‘Independence’’ and ‘‘referendum’’ have lately become the ‘‘buzz words’’ du jour in
certain regions across Europe. This article looks into the quest for independence of
Scotland from an international law and a European Union law perspective. Now that
the outcome of the Scottish referendum is known, the relevance of the analysis
consists in its impact on the future plans of other regions in Europe.1
The article presents a good opportunity for reflection that lies in the evidence and
arguments suggesting that the Scottish referendum would serve as a useful
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‘‘experiment’’ for other territories/regions in Europe with similar independence
aspirations such as Catalonia.2 In Catalonia, the current regional government has
advanced a ‘‘Declaration of Sovereignty’’, planning to hold a referendum on
Catalonia’s secession from Spain. The Catalan Government has even established a
Commission to articulate a smooth transition. In the same vein, Catalonia has taken
the first steps to explore the possibilities of becoming a member of various
international organisations.
The prospect of Scottish independence has given rise to different hypotheses
about the possible legal solutions to intricate dilemmas. It is relevant to
acknowledge at the outset that there are so many ‘‘burning questions’’ involved
in the Scottish independence debate and that most of them look at the purely
political and economic arguments for and against staying in the UK. This article,
however, deals with the legal implications as to the future powers of an independent
Scotland in the international arena and in the EU context.
In the following paragraphs, the importance of the international law aspects
involved in the Scottish referendum debate will be highlighted, the analysis
focusing on how the new state would function in the international law context. In
order to provide an overview of the questions that arise, issues of membership of
international organizations and succession of states are taken into consideration.
This paper will then turn to the EU law aspects of the Scottish referendum; in
particular it will consider the question of how independence may affect Scotland’s
status vis-a`-vis the EU.
Historical Background
The Act of the Union established in 1707 the separation of powers between Scotland
and the United Kingdom.3 Within the UK, Scotland maintained a strong national
and legal identity though.4 During the 1960s, when the SNP put the issue back on
the agenda, independence became again ‘‘an issue’’ in the form of calls for
devolution. Two events, then, converged to foster the quest for independence. On
the one hand, the SNP won a Scottish parliamentary election. On the other hand, the
discovery of new economic resources strengthened support for economic indepen-
dence. Throughout the 1970s, the Labour Party argued for the devolution of political
authority to Scottish institutions, leading to the 1979 referendum. However, the
proposal failed to reach a sufficient number of votes. Indeed, the Scottish
Devolution Referendum, held on March 1979 obtained 52 % of votes in favour of
devolution against 48 %, but the majority only represented 32.9 % of the registered
electorate as a whole.5 The issue of devolution was frozen during Conservative rule
in the 1980s and early 1990s, but re-emerged when the Labour Party took office in
2 Moreno (2006).
3 Birlin (2007).
4 Connolly (2013: 90–91).
5 Dewdney (1997).
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1997, following Tony Blair’s promise that devolution would, as Mac Intyre points
out, ‘‘lance the boil of independence.’’6
As a result of this recent historical evolution, the Scotland Act was passed as an
Act of the Parliament in 1998, re-instating the Scottish Parliament. Two aspects
included in the Scotland Act deserve special attention from an international law
perspective: the UK’s external relations and the powers of the Scottish Parliament to
implement international and EU norms into Scottish law.
Under Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act (entitled ‘‘Foreign Affairs’’), Scotland can
implement international norms in Scottish law whereas the UK is responsible for
conducting international relations.7 Schedule 5 reads ‘‘7(1) International relations,
including relations with territories outside the United Kingdom, the European
Union] (and their institutions) and other international organisations, regulation of
international trade, and international development assistance and co-operation are
reserved matters. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not reserve—(a) observing and
implementing international obligations, obligations under the Human Rights
Convention and obligations under EU law’’.8
A different way to look at the issue rather than through historic facts is to
consider the powers of the Scottish Parliament over the past 16 years. Indeed, the
Scotland Act 1998 devolved certain areas to the Scottish Parliament. With regard to
law-making by the Scottish Parliament, the ‘‘early years’’ witnessed a significant
production of measures in the different devolved areas.9 As a consequence, this
proactive approach taken by the Scottish Parliament has led to the adoption of
‘‘subordinate legislation’’ regulating different areas within its legislative compe-
tence. At present, if the laws therein enacted fall into the ‘‘reserved competences’’ of
Westminster or are incompatible with EU law or the ECHR, according to the
Scotland Act these provisions are not to be considered as ‘‘law’’ and can be struck
down by the Courts.10
Under the Scotland Act the Scottish Parliament has exercised its power in all the
devolved areas.11 The theoretical relevance of the Scotland Act for the development
of the Scottish Parliament and its devolved powers is reflected in the adoption of
different legislative acts on various fields.12
It is in the framework of the Scotland Act that a Bill was prepared for holding a
referendum about Scotland’s independence in accordance to paragraph 5A of Part 1
of Schedule 5. The Bill was passed by the Parliament on 14 November 2013 and
received Royal Assent on 17 December 2013. The UK and Scottish governments
then reached an agreement to work together to ensure a referendum on Scottish
independence takes place by the end of 2014. Finally, the referendum was scheduled
for September, 18th 2014 and citizens voted in favour of staying in the UK.
6 MacIntyre (2012).
7 MacIntyre (2012).
8 Scotland Act 1998. c.46. Sch.5.
9 Sutherland et al. (2011).
10 Finch and Munro (2012: 27).
11 Page (2011).
12 Manson-Smith (2008).
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What remains of primary importance to the future development of the question of
the independence are the relationships between Holyrood and Westminster with
regard to the different fields of competence (Brodies Public Lae Blog 2014).13 In the
event that independence had been achieved, the agreement between the central
government and the Scottish counterpart would have defined the details of the future
modus vivendi.14 Even now that the issue of independence may be shelved for some
years, it will for sure re-emerge in coming years.15 In a recent report, various aspects
concerning future independence were presented from the view of the Parliament’s
Scottish Affairs Committee. A new referendum could happen as soon as in 2017 if
the electorate use the pending referendum on EU membership to vote to withdraw
when the ‘‘Europhile Scotland’’ may take that opportunity to re-introduce the issue
of independence.
The Scottish Referendum and International Law: The Legal
Conundrum
Despite the fact that the process of achieving independence preponderantly consists
of a political and negotiated process, international law’s role is significant. In the
UK different reports addressed the implications of an independent Scotland and its
future position in the international arena. In February 2013 the UK government
published the first of a series of reports analysing Scotland’s place in the UK entitled
‘‘Scotland Analysis: Devolution and the Implications of Scottish Independence’’,
called in short the ‘‘Devolution Report’’. Annex A of the Report (hereinafter
referred to as ‘‘the Report’’) contains a legal opinion written by two highly regarded
international law scholars: Professors James Crawford and Alan Boyle.16
In addition, the Scottish Government’s White Paper on Independence (issued in
November 2013) included consideration of different aspects of the future scenario
as analysed by the European and External Relations Committee of the Scottish
Parliament. Various contentious international legal questions were examined in
light of the successor states who would have emerged after a vote for independence.
State succession is an area of international law which has not been entirely
codified yet. In general, the succession of states is governed by customary
international law.17 The rules concerning succession to treaties are of customary law
nature and some of them have been codified in the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which is not applicable to the Scottish
case because the UK is not party to it.18 The crucial issue is to determine which
treaties need to be continued by the successor state. In an overview of the main
13 Donnachie and Hewitt (2007).
14 Livingstone (2012).
15 Henley (2014).
16 UK Parliament (2013).
17 Shaw (2007: 697).
18 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and the 1983 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.
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international instruments to which Scotland could become party to one can mention,
for instance, the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In the Devolution Report, three options are defined regarding the future
relationships between Scotland and the Rest of the United Kingdom (also defined as
‘‘RUK’’), leaving the question open to the outcome of the referendum and the
political negotiations that may follow. The various options outlined include
previous examples observed in the international practice. In addition to that, by
reading the report jointly with other relevant scholarly pieces written on Scottish
independence a fourth option may be included.19
RUK as the Continuator State of the UK and Scotland as a New State
In this case the RUK would be the continuator of the original state whereas Scotland
would be considered a new state. The Opinion mentioned various examples of states
splitting into two or more new states. In most of the cases falling within this
category, the continuator state preserved ‘‘the majority of the predecessor state’s
population and territory’’ and ‘‘substantially the same governmental institutions as
the predecessor state’’ whereas the other state(s) the successor(s), like in the cases of
Pakistan, Bangladesh and the dissolution of the USSR.
RUK and Scotland as New States
In the second potential scenario presented in the Opinion, the UK would disappear.
Therefore, and as opposite to the previous option, there would be no continuator
state to the UK, since it will be dissolved. Two new states would come into being
within the international community. The report cites two cases of dissolution where
there was no continuator state: the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 31 December
1992, which resulted in the emergence of the Czech Republic and Slovakia; and the
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, from
which six new states were born. In each case all the emerging states applied for UN
membership. According to the report, it would possible to draw analogies between
the break-up of Czechoslovakia or the SFRY and the situation of Scotland and
England regarding the allocation of the different items included in the equal division
(treaty rights and obligations, as well as assets and debts). In Sloan’s view this
seems to be the approach favoured by the First Minister of Scotland who declared
that after independence Scotland and the RUK would inherit ‘‘exactly the same
international treaty rights and obligations.’’20
Scotland’s Reversion to the pre-1707 Status
Under a third envisaged option if Scottish independence was achieved Scotland and
England could have ‘‘reverted’’ to their pre-1707 Treaty of Union status as
independent states. There are two different interpretations of the same argument.
19 Sloan (2013).
20 Sloan (2013).
The ‘‘Day After’’ the Scottish Referendum: Legal…
123
First, the argument as presented in the report implied that the RUK would have been
the continuator of the UK and Scotland would have reverted to its pre-1707 status.
Second, both the RUK and Scotland would have reverted to their pre-1707 status,
with no continuator state.
In the report there are two examples mentioned of a sovereign state regaining its
previous personality, despite becoming part of another state. Amongst other
examples, in 1958 Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (‘‘UAR’’) and
agreed that obligations of both states continued to bind the new state. When, in
1961, Syria withdrew from the UAR and it was able to resume its membership in the
UN without a formal readmission. Syria ‘‘reverted’’ to its earlier status as the
sovereign state of Syria.
However, this option raises some questions as to the real possibility of a genuine
‘‘reversion’’. What is not clear is if, based on these precedents, it can be argued that
in the case of Scotland its personality never ceased to exist and that its formal legal
identity remained intact during the period from 1707 to the time of independence.
The ‘‘Sui Generis’’ Option
Despite the different precedents that can be regarded as ‘‘models’’, Scotland may
not follow a specific one. As Professor Michael Keating points out there are no
‘‘models’’ to follow.21 Similarly, Nicola Sturgeon, the Deputy First Minister, in her
reaction to the Opinion stated that: ‘‘[t]he reality is that there is neither a settled
international legal position nor any consistent precedent in these matters. [The] fact
is that international precedents—even those cited by the UK government—prove
the point that these are matters to be settled, not by law, but by sensible and mature
negotiation that reflect the particular circumstances of the countries involved.’’22
In sum, the precedents can serve as guidelines for future negotiations concerning
the details of Scottish independence. In this context, international law will regulate
the future relations of an independent Scotland with the rest of the UK and the rest
of the world.
Scotland and Statehood: To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question…
From an international law perspective, as S. Blay affirms statehood concerns ‘‘two
interlinked concepts that are at the core of the definition: territorial integrity and
political independence (Blay 2010).’’ Territorial integrity refers to the territorial
‘‘wholeness’’ of the state.23 Political independence is related to its capacity to enter
into international relations with other states.24
In the case of Scotland, in addition to the willingness to become a separate state
expressed by citizens through a positive vote in the referendum, Scottish
21 Keating (2014).
22 Sturgeon (2013).
23 Blay (2010).
24 Crawford (2009, 2011).
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independence would surely be the outcome of political negotiations. Referenda have
been frequently used in national constitutional law to address relevant issues of
international and EU law. In fact, the ‘‘use of referenda’’ in international law is
connected to the creation of new states.25 With regard to EU Law, referenda have
been used on several occasions to ratify a significant change to the founding treaties
or with regard to the accession of new Member states.
International law rules would apply to defining the main characteristics and the
crucial elements of the state that would emerge as a result of the negotiations. In a
post-referendum context, international law will also play a significant role in
positioning Scottish interests on the political agenda. More importantly, provided
that independence is achieved, international law may regulate the relations and
interactions with other European states in the event that Scotland does not acquire
immediately EU membership.
With regard to the criteria for statehood, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States represents a good starting point for analysis since it sets
out various criteria for a territorial entity to be defined as a state. According to
article 1 of the Convention these are: permanent population, delimited territory,
government and capacity to enter into relations with other states.26
In light of these provisions, Scotland would a priori satisfy the requirements:
(a) Permanent population: Scotland’s population would be that determined by its
internal law on nationality/citizenship.
(b) Internationally delimited territory: Scotland’s territory would include its land,
its territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and the airspace above its land
and territorial waters. In the boundary delimitation, any disputes that may that
arise would need to be solved by pacific means.
(c) Government: As for government, an independent Scotland would be able to
exercise effective control over its territory and people.
(d) Capacity to enter into relations with other states: The government should be
empowered to enter into relations with other states.
The referendum’s outcome will have a clear impact on Scotland’s future political
scenario and will bring consequences in the context of international law.
As stated earlier, the Scottish constitutional future may have implications for
other secessionist causes in Europe. This is particularly so for Catalan indepen-
dence. There is often confusion between different concepts when it comes to
independence. Under GA Resolution 1514 on the right to self-determination, there
are different requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to ‘‘activate’’ the right as
conferred in the Declaration.
As Knop suggests, international law lacks a clear definition of both ‘‘self-
determination’’ and ‘‘people’’. Some states in international law represent the
exercise of self-determination by a people, others do not; some peoples have their
25 Beigbeder (2011).
26 This treaty was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on
December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934.
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own state, others do not.27 Borrowing from Knop again, ‘‘international law has
limited the revolutionary potential of self-determination in several ways (…) on the
dominant approach, self-determination developed into a right in certain categories
of cases: overseas colonies, cases in which a people is subject to alien subjugation,
domination or exploitation; and (…) when people is denied any meaningful exercise
of its right to determination within the state of which forms a part.’’28 The recent
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s independence generated controversy (ICJ 2010).
Countries such as Spain refused to recognise Kosovo as a new independent state.29
On a strict interpretation, neither Scotland nor other cases in Europe (such as
Catalonia or Flanders) would fall into the Declaration’s scope.30 Despite the
similarities and parallel developments between the Catalan and the Scottish case
they are different under international law. Whereas in the Scottish case there would
be a ‘‘negotiated independence’’, in the case of Catalonia the party in national
government is claiming the right to exercise its sovereignty.31 However, the
historical development of the Catalan legal situation is different from Scotland’s.
Catalonia was integrated in the Spanish state from the middle of the fifteenth
century, retaining some self-government institutions until the eighteenth century.
Scotland is comprised within the territory of a parent state (the United Kingdom) by
virtue of the 1707 Treaty of Union and the 2014 referendum was organised, as seen
before, according to the Scotland Act’s provisions. In the case of Catalonia, there is
no consensus in the national government and the principle of territorial integrity
applies, therefore, it would be in conflict with the Spanish Constitution as the
Constitutional Court has already stated in a recent judgement.32
Recognition of States
Another question to be taken into consideration is the recognition of the new state
by other states in the international community. Essentially, recognition by the pre-
existent states is not necessary under international law in order to be considered an
independent state. Recognition of states is essentially based on political reasons.
Even if recognition does not possess a constitutive effect, it affects the capacity of
the new state to enter into relations with other ‘‘peers’’.33 The lack of recognition
poses serious implications for the consolidation of the new state on the international
stage. Take, for instance, the case of Northern Cyprus, the only state that has
recognized it as a separate and independent state is Turkey.
Although a political act, recognition produces legal effects in international and
domestic law. In similar cases states have refused to recognise new states where to
27 Knop (2012: 101).
28 Knop (2012: 102).
29 Olmos Giupponi (2011).
30 Thurer and Burri (2008).
31 Desquens (2003).
32 Spanish Constitutional Court (2014).
33 Mas (2014).
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do so may be taken as providing a precedent that might activate or reinforce
domestic demands for independence.
As far as the international law effects of recognition are concerned, a recognised
state can enter into legal and political relations with other states, whereas a non-
recognised state cannot enter into legal or political relations with those states that
have refused to recognise it. That said, it is possible to talk about in principle a de
facto recognition of a new state, i.e. some initial forms of contact and relations may
be established with other states. Even though this not a legal recognition, it is
recognition in principle.
Seeking Membership on the International Level: Scotland’s Membership
in International Organizations
One of the main issues involved in the recognition of a new state in the international
community and, of utmost importance for its relationships with other states, is the
acquisition of membership in different international organisations.34 The application
to a become member of a particular organisation may even precede- the acquisition
of statehood as in the case of Palestine’s entry to UNESCO.
The criteria for membership varies from one international organisation to another
based on the requirements set out in the respective founding treaty and the specific
practice of the organisation. With regard to the question of whether international
treaties would be implemented directly within Scotland or would need to be
incorporated into domestic law, this will depend on how the Scottish constitution
addresses the relationship between international and domestic law. If dualism is the
approach chosen, then international law instruments would need- to be incorporated,
and Scotland should enact legislation in order to incorporate them into national law.
If Scotland had achieved its independence, the dominant opinion was that it
would have needed to apply for membership, whereas the RUK would have retained
the UK’s prior membership-. The brand new state would, then, try to join different
international organisations in order to gain international recognition and protect its
national interests.35 The impact of independence on the membership of international
organisations would be different according to the goals pursued by them.
It is worth considering the possible international organisations to which Scotland
may have applied for membership bearing in mind that EU membership will be
addressed extensively in another section of this article.36 At this point, we should
just note the Report issued by the Scottish Affairs Select Committee of the House of
Commons, ‘‘Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Scotland’s Membership of the
EU.’’37 According to this report, there is agreement among the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Select Committee that the Scottish Government ‘‘underestimates the
unease which exists within EU Member states and EU institutions about Scottish
34 Magliveras (2011: 84).
35 UK Parliament (2014).
36 UK Parliament (2014).
37 Keating (2014).
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independence.’’38 This would mean that the period required for negotiation is longer
than anticipated by the Scottish Government but, ultimately, all 28 Member states
have the right to veto Scottish membership of the EU (Douglas-Scott 2014).
There has often been a polarisation in the debate as to the possibility of an
independent Scotland becoming an EU Member state.39 Basically, the Scottish
government believed that it would automatically become a member of the EU on
similar terms to the UK. To the contrary, the UK government maintained that an
independent Scotland would have to apply for membership or, in the worst case-
scenario that Scotland would have been kept at the margins of the EU. There was
often a perception reflected by legal scholars that the fact that the Scottish
Government did not ‘‘take this threat seriously demonstrates a lack of understanding
of the realities of international politics.’’40
Undoubtedly, the first international organisation of which an independent
Scotland would seek membership would be the United Nations, for the legal and
political consequences that it entails regarding the recognition of a territorial entity
as a state. UN membership criteria are laid down in article 4 of the UN Charter that
reads ‘‘1 Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment
of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.’’ Once
independence was achieved, Scotland could submit an application to the Secretary-
General in which it accepts the obligations established in the UN Charter. After that,
the application would be examined by the Admission of New Members Committee
and subsequently be sent to the Security Council. Finally, upon the positive
recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly (GA) would
discuss the application and adopt a final decision by a two-thirds majority of the
present and voting members (Article 18(2) United Nations Charter). The two crucial
elements in the process are that the applicant meets the requirements set out in the
Charter and avoids the veto of a permanent member of the Security Council. Thus,
provided that these admission criteria are met (and it is likely that this would be the
case) Scotland would become a UN Member state. One particularly difficult issue
regards the UK’s permanent seat at the Security Council. According to the Foreign
Office, in the event of Scottish independence the remaining UK state would retain
its permanent place on the United Nations Security Council.
Apart from UN membership, there are other relevant organisations that deserve
to be considered. In our view, in most cases new states must apply anew for
membership.
In the field of security, the most important organisation to become party to is
NATO. Membership of NATO constitutes an interesting case. Traditionally, the
SNP has held a policy in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Consequently,
until 2012 the SNP also maintained the position that an independent Scotland should
not be a member of NATO, mainly because it is a nuclear weapons-based alliance.
However, this position changed at the SNP annual conference in October 2012,
38 UK Parliament-Scottish Affairs Committee (2014).
39 UK Parliament (2014).
40 UK Parliament-Scottish Affairs Committee (2014).
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where a Foreign, Security and Defence policy update was agreed including a
commitment to remain a member of NATO.41
That being the case, Scotland would have needed to fulfil all the conditions laid
down in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as agreed by Scotland and NATO. The
MAP would cover legal issues concerning its membership as well as political,
economic, defence, military and security matters. In the event of Scottish
independence, a certain level of flexibility is foreseen. Even if NATO member
states must respect the obligations of the Treaty, and amongst them the Strategic
Concept, according to which NATO is mainly defined as a nuclear alliance, some
flexibility may be needed for Scotland’s participation as a Member state in the
Alliance; this somehow would contribute to solve the controversial question of the
nuclear weapons’ facilities in Scottish territory.
In the area of economic cooperation, there are also other international
organisations to which a new state may apply in order to strengthening its powers
its international economic status.
In the European context, as a back-up plan to EU membership a European state
could become part of the other main economic organisation: the European Free
Trade Association (consisting of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein).42In
contrast to the EU which is a supranational organisation, EFTA is an intergovern-
mental organisation, focusing on certain areas of cooperation. This would be an
alternative organisation that Scotland could join if EU membership is obstructed or
difficult to achieve. Since the principal goal of the EFTA Convention is to regulate
free trade among member states within the European Economic Area (EEA)
Agreement between the EU and EFTA, Scotland as an EFTA member state would
enjoy guarantees of the EU internal market.
The possibility that Scotland would have also needed to become a member of
international economic organisations has also been considered. The WTO
comprises different agreements, with states and organisations as members and
includes a dispute settlement mechanism. As for international financial institutions,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a financial organisation whose objective is
to adopt a global monetary policy, financial co-operation and economic stability. It
would also be convenient to join the World Bank as an organisation with the
mandate to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries.
The International Labour Organisation is another international organisation
significant for Scotland’s interests. To join the ILO, Scotland would need to ratify a
total of 396 conventions, protocols, and recommendations.43
Another area of particular interest for Scotland would be the law of the sea,
taking into account the importance of maritime resources for its economic
development with regard to the resources available in the North Sea, mainly oil. The
law of the sea deals with a number of maritime areas and rights and duties of states
over these areas, including rules on maritime delimitation which will be of critical
importance to Scotland. In international law, the norms regulating the sea are
41 UK Parliament (2014).
42 Harpaz (2009).
43 ILO (2014).
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codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 (Territorial Sea, High Seas,
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources, and Continental Shelf) and in the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Another relevant issue that should be stressed is maritime delimitation. Maritime
delimitation involves legal questions as well as geographical, geological, economic
and political dimensions. In light of the law of the sea, customary principles that
apply to maritime delimitation are that (a) It is not possible to proclaim unilateral
delimitations, and (b) the delimitation should be set up on the basis of
equitable criteria.44 Agreements will be the way in which Scotland may delimit
its maritime zones. In the event that disputes arise, they should be submitted to
arbitration, or submit it to a court, for example the International Court of Justice or
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, if it has jurisdiction.
In the context of future independence, Scotland would need to become party to
the main instruments on the protection of human rights: international and regional,
general and specialised. For a new state, the accession to human rights treaties
would be a central plank for enforcing citizens’ rights and at the same time it would
demonstrate the new state’s commitment to protecting and promoting human rights.
On the regional level, with regard to membership to the Council of Europe (CoE)
the crucial instrument is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The
participation in the ECHR depends on the membership of the Council of Europe.
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 has introduced the ECHR into the UK legal system,
the Convention is already of application in Scotland. The provision of the Scotland
Act with regard to the Convention reinforces the incorporation of it into a theoretical
framework for a post-referendum scenario. In the hypothetical scenario of indepen-
dence, the ECHR may continue to apply it without interruptions following a
declaration of independence and even before Scotland may become party to the CoE.
Once Scotland would become party to the ECHR, it would be necessary to ratify
the additional Protocols to the ECHR. Another relevant effect is that as party to the
ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would have automatic
jurisdiction to receive individual applications concerning possible violations of the
ECHR by Scotland. Scotland could participate as well in the inter-state complaints
system, being able to bring cases before the ECtHR against other states or being the
object of them.
Moreover, there are many other human rights instruments to which Scotland may
accede. In all these cases, apart from becoming party to international human rights
treaties, accession is relevant in order to grant individuals the right to petition before
international human rights bodies. This would be the case, for instance, with the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, both of which recognise the right to submit petitions. At the moment, the
UK is not a party to neither of them. Scotland may take another approach.
Finally, in terms of multilateral cooperation, other international organizations in
different fields may become relevant for the state in order to entertain relations with
other states in the international community. In terms of multilateral cooperation,
44 Tsagourias (2014).
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cultural organisations, such as UNESCO or the International Organisation of La
Francophonie, may also be interesting taking into account Scotland’s historical ties
with France in the latter case. The overview of the impact of international law with
regard to the Scottish referendum provides insights into the endeavour involved in
the creation of a new state.
Critical Reflections on the Post-Referendum Scenario
In the post-referendum scenario, the following reflections can be drawn from the
Scottish case:
• Regions in Europe as sub-state entities are demanding more participation on the
international arena. The Scottish case is not an isolated one, Catalonia and
Flanders share similar demands.
• Membership of international organisations is one of the key stages in the process
of recognition and creation of states. As the analysis shows, central and regional
governments may have a different (and in some case opposed) viewpoint on a
specific matter in the context of international organisations. In this case it is
crucial to better articulate different interests.
• The Scottish referendum represented a negotiated process of independence
allowed under UK constitutional law (namely the provisions of the Scotland
Act) which led to a referendum with a significant turnout of citizens.1
• A unilateral declaration calling for a referendum or declaring independence
from a state would constitute ‘‘a priori’’ a secession not legitimised under
international law (unless it is a so-called ‘‘remedial secession’’).
In sum, examining the impact of the Scottish referendum from an international law
viewpoint is something more than a theoretical exercise. It definitely brings deep
connotations to the United Kingdom as a state on the international arena and to other
nations or regions within European states that may also want to further secession.
EU Law Aspects
The Different Positions
According to the Scottish or Catalan government, their newly independent state
would continue to be part of the EU after its declaration of independence.45 This
argument is not surprising. Supposedly unproblematic continued membership of the
EU implies that citizens will enjoy continuity in times of change, which is without
doubt an argument the psychological effect of which is not to be underestimated.
Some regional governments have even gone so far as to expressly counsel that any
fear of the implication of independence in this respect be wholly unfounded,
claiming that the newly independent region shall remain within the safe haven of the
45 See The Scottish Parliament Official Report (25.01. 2012) Referendum Consultation.
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EU (‘Independence in Europe’). The EU’s fundamental freedoms enjoyed by
citizens to date would remain in place. For instance, trade would be unaffected,
since free movement of goods would continue as before.46 The same is true for the
free movement of workers.
This viewpoint is opposed by a prima facie unusual coalition made up of the
European Council, European Commission and governments, in particular the
Spanish government. The former President of the European Commission, Jose´
Manuel Barroso, has resolutely spoken out against the idea that an independent
Scotland would automatically become a member of the EU. In a BBC interview in
December 2012 he stated that ‘if one part of a country … wants to become an
independent state, of course as an independent state it has to apply for European
Union membership according to the rules—that is obvious’.47
This appears to be the consolidated opinion of the European Commission. As
early as March 2004, the then President of the Commission Romano Prodi stated
likewise that: ‘The European Communities and the European Union have been
established by the relevant treaties among the Member states. The treaties apply to
the Member states.48 When a part of the territory of a Member state ceases to be a
part of that state, e.g. because the territory becomes an independent state, the treaties
will no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a newly independent region
would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the
Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore
on its territory’.49 Statements along similar lines have also been issued by the
President of the European Council, as well as by Spanish and British government
representatives. What binds this alliance together is the fear of a domino effect. If
one were to make the Scots’ or Catalans’ decision to secede easier by allowing them
to remain in the EU, this might result in a ‘wave of secessions’: Flanders, the
46 Sturgeon (2013).
47 Transcript of the BBC Hardtalk Interview, 10. December 2012, available online at http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20664907. Following a request by the House of Lords, President
Barroso specified his position in a letter, dated 10 December 2012:
(1) ‘The EU is founded on the Treaties which apply only to the Member states who have agreed and
ratified them.
(2) If part of the territory of a Member state would cease to be part of that state because it were to
become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory.
(3) In other words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third
country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory.
(4) Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state which respects the
principles set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union may apply to become a member of the EU.
(5) If the application is accepted by the Council acting unanimously, an agreement is then negotiated
between the applicant state and the Member states on the conditions of admission and the adjustments to
the Treaties which such admission entails.
(6) This agreement is subject to ratification by all Member states and the applicant state.’
Letter of the President of the European Commission Jose Barroso to the Chairman of the House of
Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Lord Tugendhat, 10 December 2012, available online at http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-affairs/ScottishIndependence/EA68_Scotland_
and_the_EU_Barroso’s_reply_to_Lord_Tugendhat_101212.pdf
48 Article 299 ECT: this was essentially replaced by Article 52 TEU.
49 Response of the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, (2004) OJ C84E/422.
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Basque region and South Tyrol could follow. So far Spanish government
representatives have been the most forthright in expressing their fear in this
respect,50 stating clearly that Madrid will not tolerate any secession by Catalonia.51
The following can therefore be said in summary: over the course of time, two
diametrically opposed viewpoints have developed, namely continued membership
of the EU versus an automatic exit from the EU. Which of these two points of view,
however, is the legally correct one? This question shall be examined in depth below.
The Situation de lege lata
Article 52 TEU is the starting point for legal deliberations on a newly independent
region’s (NIR) future status vis-a`-vis the European Union, as it determines the scope
of application of EU law in more detail. It provides:
1. The Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom
of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese
Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the
Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland.
2. The territorial scope of the Treaties is specified in Article 355 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union.
Article 52 TEU embodies the fundamental principle of international law that
rather than enjoying ‘original’ territorial sovereignty, international organisations
merely enjoy so-called ‘derivative’ territorial sovereignty transferred to those
organisations by their Member states.52 The territorial scope of application of the
Treaties is thus defined in more detail by reference to the Member states in
accordance with Article 52 TEU.
If one applies this provision to the Catalan scenario, the result is as follows:
Under Article 52 the European Treaties apply to the sovereign territory that is the
Kingdom of Spain.53 At present Catalonia is still part of this sovereign territory. If,
however, Catalonia were to leave this union, it would no longer be an integral part
of the EU Member state that is the Kingdom of Spain.54 As a consequence, EU law
would no longer apply to Catalonia. In other words, on a literal interpretation of
Article 52 TEU an independent Catalonia would not only drop out of Spain but also
50 Buck (2013).
51 Whittaker (2013).
52 Streinz (2012).
53 For further specifications see Article 355 TFEU.
54 Crawford/Boyle (2013).
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automatically out of the EU (with immediate effect!). The automatic knock-on
effect contained in Article 52 TEU therefore combines two issues that are separate
per se—i.e. secession from Spain on the one hand and exiting the EU on the other.
Linking these two (separate) issues in this manner seems highly questionable.
Critical Analysis
On closer inspection this appears to be a strange conclusion for a number of reasons,
which shall be examined in more detail below.
The ‘Loss of Subjective Rights’ Argument
The Argument As explained above, Catalonia/Scotland will remain an integral part
of the EU until it declares its independence. Until such a time, Catalans/Scots55 and
any other EU citizens56 living in the said regions will continue to enjoy the full
range of rights derived from their EU citizenship. For instance, under Article 20
TFEU, EU citizens have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member states57; moreover, they enjoy the right to vote and stand as candidates
in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member
state of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that state.58Finally, they
enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member state of which they are
nationals is not represented, the right to the protection of the diplomatic and
consular authorities of any Member state on the same conditions as the nationals of
that state (Article 20 II c TFEU).59 Moreover, a number of additional rights
originating from the four fundamental freedoms also apply, provided their specific
prerequisites had been met. All in all, EU membership accords EU citizens a
multitude of rights.
If one were to proceed on the ‘automatism’ assumption set out above then all of
these rights would expire the moment the declaration of independence was made.
Catalans/ Scots would be deprived of their standing as EU citizens ‘over night’, so
to speak. EU citizens living in Catalonia/ Scotland would also no longer be able to
call upon the aforementioned rights, since those ‘regions’ would no longer be part of
the EU. The consequences would therefore be far-reaching. A few examples show
quite emphatically what the effect would be. French fishermen would no longer be
permitted to fish in Catalan/Scottish waters. Greek doctors who had been working in
Catalan/ Scottish hospitals for years would no longer benefit from the principle of
free movement of workers, and would consequently have to apply for a work
permit. The same would apply vice versa to Catalans/ Scots working abroad in
another EU country. The many Catalans working in Madrid, in particular, would
feel the lasting effects thereof.
55 As nationals of the EU Member state Spain/UK.
56 See Article 9 TEU and Article 20 et seq. TFEU.
57 Article 20 (II) (a), in conjunction with Article 21 TFEU.
58 Article 20 (II) (b), in conjunction with Article 22 TFEU.
59 Article 20 (II) (c), in conjunction with Article 23 TFEU.
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Counterargument Against this, one might argue that the consequences set out
above appear—at least prima facie—to be harsher than they really are.60
(1) Although in principle it is correct to say that EU citizens living in Scotland
would no longer be able to rely on the aforementioned rights if Scotland were
to leave the EU, this problem could be rectified—at least partially—by a
unilateral decree on the part of the new Scottish government to the effect that
EU law would continue to apply in Scotland. As a sovereign state, Scotland
would certainly be entitled to issue a decree of this nature.
(2) As regards the effect on Scottish citizens, the said effect can be relativized if
one bears in mind that nationals of third countries—which is what the Scots
would then be—also enjoy certain rights under EU law. Third country
nationals can, for instance, rely on those fundamental freedoms which do not
explicitly apply to nationals of EU Member states only, such as the free
movement of goods.61 Under Article 28(2) TFEU, free movement of goods
simply ties in with the provenance of the goods. It is all the more applicable
in relation to the free movement of capital, since Article 63(1) TFEU even
goes as far as prohibiting restrictions on the movement of capital between the
EU and third countries. A number of rights for third country nationals are also
enshrined within the EU’s secondary law. To some extent non-EU nationals
even enjoy the same protection against discrimination as EU citizens, such as
under the provisions of Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.62
Refutation of the Counterargument Ultimately, however, the counterargument
presented above is not entirely convincing either. As before, it is worth
differentiating between EU nationals living in Scotland and Scottish nationals
themselves.
(1) With regard to EU nationals living in Scotland, it is highly uncertain whether
the new Scottish government will in fact decree unilaterally that EU law
norms shall continue to apply. Even if this were the case, a decree of this
nature would at best cover a fraction of the aforementioned rights. The legal
provisions of Article 20(2) in conjunction with Article 22(2) TFEU are an
example of this, since from a purely logical point of view these rights could
not be covered by a unilateral decree. The same applies to many other legal
situations.
(2) What is more, nationals of third countries—and this would now include the
Scots as well—are only granted a fraction of the rights enjoyed by EU
citizens. Free movement of persons, in particular, is inextricably linked to
60 It is worth differentiating insofar between (1) EU nationals living in Scotland and (2) Scottish
nationals themselves.
61 Schroeder (2011).
62 Schroeder (2011).
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citizenship of a EU Member state.63 The same applies to the rights set out in
Article 21 et seq. TFEU. Consequently, Scots living abroad in a EU Member
state could expect their rights to be significantly curtailed. The following can
therefore be said in conclusion: as commendable as the granting of rights to
third countries may seem, this should not detract from the fact that these
rights only constitute a fraction of the rights arising under the EU Treaties.
Systematic Aspects: Comparison with Article 50 TEU
For the reasons just analysed it is highly questionable, whether this consequence—
i.e. automatic and immediate exit from the EU upon independence—was really
intended by the drafters of the Treaties, or whether it was rather a scenario which the
legislators of ‘an ever closer Union’ had not anticipated at all, In other words, a
lacuna in the law (Edwards 2012). A comparison with Article 50 TEU, which
codifies the withdrawal from the EU, seems to support this hypothesis. The specific
wording of the provision is as follows:
(1) Any Member state may decide to withdraw from the European Union in
accordance with its own constitutional provisions.
(2) A Member state which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council
of its intentions. In light of the guidelines provided by the European Council,
the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that state setting
out the arrangements of withdrawal taking account of the framework of its
future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in
accordance with Article 218 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council
of Ministers, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.
(3) The Treaties shall cease to apply to the state in question from the date of entry
into force of the withdrawal agreement, or failing that, two years after the
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in
agreement with the Member state concerned, decides to extend this period.
(4) For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council
or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member state shall not
participate in the European Council or the Council discussions or decisions
concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article
238 (3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5) If a state which has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its request shall
be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
The scenario of a withdrawal following a lawful secession from the ‘mother
state’64 is not addressed at all by Article 50 TEU, hence one might draw the
63 Geiger et al. (2010).
64 Combined with the wish to remain in the Union.
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following conclusion: If a provision, such as Article 50 TEU, which deals explicitly
and in detail with exit from the EU, does not cover the scenario outlined above, then
it would be far-fetched to assume that this complex scenario was implicitly dealt
with in Article 52 TEU. Rather it implies that the legislators were simply not aware
of the problem.65
An immediate exit from the EU—triggered by the automatism of Article 52
TEU—would hardly be reconcilable with the spirit of Article 50(3) TEU. The
underlying rationale of Article 50(3) can be summarised as follows: Withdrawal
from the EU is a long and complex process that does not happen ‘over night’. Thus,
Article 50(3) provides that withdrawal only becomes effective (a) once the two year
period following notification of withdrawal to the Council has expired or (b) a
withdrawal agreement has been successfully concluded. Given the complexity of the
latter it seems reasonable to assume that such negotiations will drag on for quite a
while (1-2 years). This purpose—i.e. to give the parties concerned time to solve the
complex issues arising from withdrawal—would be completely thwarted, if one
allowed for an immediate66 withdrawal under Article 52 TEU. This was not
intended by the drafters as Article 50(3) TEU clearly shows. To construe such an
immediate withdrawal via the automatism of Article 52 TEU therefore appears to be
highly questionable.
Further Dogmatic Conflicts
A further conflict of values can be observed in relation to the ideological concepts
behind the EU Treaties: the ‘automatism’ discussed above would, ultimately, lead to
a newly independent region (e.g. Catalonia) being excluded from the EU. The
region would have to leave the EU against the democratically legitimised wishes of
its citizens (Hofmeister 2010). The EU Treaties, on the other hand, make no
provision for any expulsion of this nature. Although the possibility of an expulsion
procedure was discussed by the Constitutional Convention, it was in the end
rejected for sound reasons.67 The EU—so the thinking goes—is a democratic
institution which endeavours to solve conflicts amicably by mutual discussion. This
way of thinking is incompatible with any one-sided ‘expulsion’ of a state. If
contrary to all expectations an issue arose that could not be solved by mutual
agreement, then consideration would at the most be given to the sanctions envisaged
by Article 7 TEU.68 These include, inter alia, the suspension of certain rights under
the agreement, notably the right to vote in the Council, not however an expulsion
from the EU. If one keeps these consequences in mind, it appears very doubtful
indeed that this is the result the drafters of the treaties would have wanted.
65 Edwards (2012).
66 As well as automatic withdrawal.
67 See ‘Suggestion for amendment of Article I-59 by Brok et alt. on behalf of the EPP Convention
Group’, der letztlich verworfen wurde, abrufbar online unter http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/
treaty/pdf/46/46_Art%20I%2059%20Brok%20EN.pdf
68 And the measuers envisaged under Articles 258 et seq. TFEU as well as Article 126 (11) TFEU.
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The bizarre consequences inherent in the automatism described above become all
the more evident, if one leaves aside for the moment the Catalan/Scottish scenario
and focuses on another state harbouring similar intentions: Belgium. Assuming that
Flanders or Wallonia secede from Belgium or Belgium as a whole is dissolved with
no continuator state left, could anyone seriously argue that Brussels—the seat of
most EU Institutions—would no longer be in the EU?69
Conclusion
Despite these serious misgivings, a plain reading of Article 52 TEU nevertheless
leads one to conclude that—de lege lata—a newly independent region, such as
Catalonia, Scotland or Flanders will exit the EU automatically and with immediate
effect upon independence.
Ways Out of the Dilemma: Conclusions
One potential way to circumvent the problems outlined above, is to apply Article 48
TEU to the case under consideration. This was, for example, suggested by the
Scottish government during the 2014 referendum campaign. In its White Paper,70 the
Scottish government argued that an independent Scotland would become a Member
state of the EU upon independence and that this can be achieved through a revision of
the EU Treaties on the basis of Article 48.71 Instead of invoking the standard
provision for accession to the EU—i.e. Article 49 TEU—the government thus
proposed an alternative legal basis for the country’s EU membership in the form of
Article 48 TEU.72 Article 48 TEU, which deals with treaty revision, provides:
1. The Treaties may be amended in accordance with an ordinary revision
procedure. They may also be amended in accordance with simplified revision
procedures.
Ordinary revision procedure
69 The various scenarios of what would happen to Belgium in case of secession of one or more parts of
the country were analysed by Conolly: ‘The critical complication, however is Brussels. Flemish
nationalists envision Brussels as a part of any future Flemish state. But many Walloons—not to mention
many francophones in Brussels itself—argue that in the event of Flemish secession, Brussels should be
joined to Wallonia. This might involve incorporation not only of Brussels proper but also of some
francophone suburbs or a corridor of territory between Brussels and the Walloon border. In such
circumstances, Wallonia could make a more credible case that it represents the continuation of the
Belgian state. Under a third scenario, Brussels would become an autonomous capital district—in effect,
the EU’s version of Washington, D.C. While this latter scenario might solve continuity and extinction
issues (the international community would almost certainly consider Belgium dissolved), it would
nonetheless present a different headache for the EU: the loss of one member state and two new states (or
perhaps three, depending on the status of the Brussels capital district within the EU) seeking admission’,
Conolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty and the European Union, Duke Journal of
International and Comparative Law (24) 2013, 90-91.
70 And the supplementary document ‘Scotland in the European Union’.
71 Armstrong, European and External Relations Committee, Scottish Parliament, Scottish Membership of
the European Union, CELS Working Paper Series, No.2. (2014), 3.
72 Ibid. 3.
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2. The Government of any Member state, the European Parliament or the
Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the
Treaties. These proposals may, inter alia, serve either to increase or to reduce
the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. These proposals shall
be submitted to the European Council by the Council and the national
Parliaments shall be notified.
3. If the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the
Commission, adopts by a simple majority a decision in favour of examining the
proposed amendments, the President of the European Council shall convene a
Convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, of the
Heads of state or Government of the Member states, of the European Parliament
and of the Commission. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in
the case of institutional changes in the monetary area. The Convention shall
examine the proposals for amendments and shall adopt by consensus a
recommendation to a conference of representatives of the governments of the
Member states as provided for in paragraph 4. The European Council may
decide by a simple majority, after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament, not to convene a Convention should this not be justified by the
extent of the proposed amendments. In the latter case, the European Council
shall define the terms of reference for a conference of representatives of the
governments of the Member states.
4. A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member states shall
be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by
common accord the amendments to be made to the Treaties.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member
states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
5. If, two years after the signature of a treaty amending the Treaties, four fifths of
the Member states have ratified it and one or more Member states have
encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter shall be
referred to the European Council. (…).73
73 Article 48 (1)-(5) TEU. Article 48 TEU further provides:
Simplified revision procedures
6. The Government of any Member state, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit to
the European Council proposals for revising all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union relating to the internal policies and action of the Union.
The European Council may adopt a decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Council shall act by unanimity after
consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, and the European Central Bank in the case of
institutional changes in the monetary area. That decision shall not enter into force until it is approved by
the Member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The decision referred to in the second subparagraph shall not increase the competences conferred on
the Union in the Treaties.
7. Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Title V of this Treaty provides for
the Council to act by unanimity in a given area or case, the European Council may adopt a decision
authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in that area or in that case. This subparagraph shall
not apply to decisions with military implications or those in the area of defence.
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for legislative acts to be adopted
by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, the European Council may adopt a
decision allowing for the adoption of such acts in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.
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The standard scenario in which Article 48 TEU is invoked by Member states is
when they plan to change EU primary law. So far it has never been employed as a
legal ‘basis for extending the rights and duties created by the treaties to an entity
seeking to become a Member state.’74 The underlying rationale to employ Article
48 TEU is that ‘the treaties currently apply to the territory and institutions that
would form the new state. For this reason, it is argued that the newly independent
region ought not to follow an accession process under Article 49 TEU but instead
that the territorial scope of application of the treaties should continue to apply to it
through a revision of the treaties under Article 48 TEU’.75
While prima facie convincing, this approach is subject to criticism—both
dogmatic and practical: First, EU institutions and Member states cannot simply
choose legal bases as they please. Rather, EU law has established a set of rules that
apply when selecting legal bases. One of these rules is the traditional legal principle
of ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’.76 Under the conception of the EU Treaties,
however, accession is supposed to take place in accordance with the specific rules
laid down in Article 49 TEU, which therefore appears to be lex specialis to Article
48 TEU.
But is that really the case? For the lex specialis principle to apply both provisions
must basically cover the same subject matter. Only then will the more specific
provision supersede the more general one: Yet this does not appear to be the case
here. Article 49 TEU regulates the accession of a state that is currently outside the
EU. In other words, it was drafted ‘with a view to states that, being outside the EU,
would like to join it. Yet, a revision treaty accommodating Catalan/Scottish
membership would be agreed before Catalonia/Scotland would be an external state,
and therefore before Article 49 would become applicable. It would not deal with
accession of a new Member state, but rather with the creation of a new Member
state by disaggregation of one of the current Member states.’77
Assuming that Article 48 TEU would therefore be applicable in the case at hand,
its application in practice would nonetheless run into other problems: Pursuant to
Article 48(1) only the government of an existing Member state can initiate the
amendment process under Article 48(1). In other words, the seceding region would
have to rely on the ‘mother state’ to initiate proceedings and negotiate its terms of
Footnote 73 continued
Any initiative taken by the European Council on the basis of the first or the second subparagraph shall
be notified to the national Parliaments. If a national Parliament makes known its opposition within six
months of the date of such notification, the decision referred to in the first or the second subparagraph
shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the European Council may adopt the decision.
For the adoption of the decisions referred to in the first and second subparagraphs, the European
Council shall act by unanimity after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be
given by a majority of its component members.
74 Armstrong (2014).
75 Ibid.,3.
76 The lex specialis principle has a long history in international jurisprudence. Hugo Grotius, for
example, aptly summarised its rationale in De Jure belli ac pacis. Libri Tres, Book II Sect. XXIX.
77 De Witte (2014).
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membership in the EU. Likewise, Article 48(4) explicitly provides that any
amendments agreed upon shall only ‘enter into force after being ratified by all the
Member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.
Again, the seceding region—be it Catalonia, Flanders or Scotland—would have to
rely on the goodwill and support of the ‘mother state’. This problem could only be
circumvented, if the ‘mother state’ (Spain/UK) was willing to act on the newly
independent region’s behalf, for it already constitutes an existing EU Member state.
Yet, as the Spanish example shows this is rather unlikely. Moreover, the newly
independent region might also prefer to negotiate itself rather than putting its fate
into the hands of a state it wants to secede from.78
In short, applying Article 48 TEU to the case under consideration is far from the
ideal solution. It works only as an ultima ratio option. The ‘Article 49 TEU route’
does not make much sense either, as it would not avoid the manifold problems
outlined above (cf. the hiatus issue and the temporary loss of rights). Given that the
EU is a so-called ‘Rechtsgemeinschaft’ (‘community of law’), its citizens and
particularly those from regions contemplating independence deserve a degree of
legal certainty. It is therefore up to the legislator de lege ferenda to change the
situation and codify a new norm allowing for a newly independent region to become
a Member of the EU without the problems outlined above.
Conclusions
Although Scotland has decided against independence one thing is for sure: The
debate on independence in certain regions in Europe has gained momentum. The
country north of Hadrian’s Wall has, in a manner of speaking, lit a spark: Catalonia,
the Basque region, South Tyrol and Greenland could soon follow. In view of its
potential to set a precedent, the ‘Scottish scenario’ was therefore analysed in more
detail and the following conclusions were reached:
From an international law viewpoint, an independent Scotland would have to
face the challenge of successfully passing the ‘‘statehood test’’ and becoming a
member of different international organizations in order to increase its global
standing. As regards a newly independent region’s future status vis-a`–vis the EU,
the following results can be observed: A plain reading of the European treaties—in
particular Article 52 TEU—leads one to conclude that—de lege lata—a newly
independent region will exit the EU automatically and with immediate effect upon
independence.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
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78 One might, however, argue that an obligation for the mother state to act on the seceding region’s
behalf, could be derived from reading Articles 2, 4, 20 TEU together as well as from the spirit of Article
50 given the emphasis the latter places on pre-withdrawal negotiations.
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